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Recommendations from The 9/11 Commission Report
(emphasis added)
1. The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual
or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic
strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all
elements of national power. We should reach out, listen to, and work
with other countries that can help. (pg. 367)
2. If Musharraf stands for enlightened moderation
in a fight for his life and for the life of his country, the
United States should be willing to make hard choices too,
and make the difficult long-term commitment to the future
of Pakistan. Sustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan,
the United States should support Pakistan's government in its
struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that
extends from military aid to support for better education,
so long as Pakistan's leaders remain willing to make difficult
choices of their own. (pg. 369)
3. The President and the Congress deserve praise
for their efforts in Afghanistan so far. Now the United States
and the international community should make a long-term
commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan, in order
to give the government a reasonable opportunity to improve
the life of the Afghan people. Afghanistan must not again
become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism.
The United States and the international community should
help the Afghan government extend its
authority over the country, with a strategy and
nation-by-nation commitments
to achieve their objectives. (pg. 370)
4. The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship
must be confronted, openly. The United States and Saudi
Arabia must determine if they can build a relationship
that political leaders on both sides are prepared to
publicly defend-a relationship about more than oil.
It should include a shared commitment to political
and economic reform, as Saudis make
common cause with the outside world.
It should include a shared interest in
greater tolerance and cultural respect,
translating into a commitment to
fight the violent extremists who foment hatred. (pg. 374)
5. The U.S. government must define what the message
is, what it stands for. We should offer an example of moral
leadership in the world, committed to treat people humanely,
abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to our
neighbors. America and Muslim friends can agree on respect
for human dignity and opportunity. To Muslim parents,
terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their
children but visions of violence and death. America
and its friends have a crucial advantage-we can offer
these parents a vision that might give their children a
better future. If we
heed the views of thoughtful leaders in the Arab and
Muslim world, a
moderate consensus can be found. (pg. 376)
6. Where Muslim governments, even those
who are friends, do not respect these principles, the
United States must stand for a better future. One of
the lessons of the long Cold War was that short-term
gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal
governments were too often outweighed by long-term
setbacks for America's stature and interests. (pg. 376)
7. Just as we did in the Cold War, we need
to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. America does
stand up for its values. The United States defended,
and still defends, Muslims against tyrants and criminals
in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. If
the United States does not act aggressively to define
itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly
do the job for us.
Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely
on satellite television
and radio, the government has begun some promising
initiatives in television
and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran,
and Afghanistan. These
efforts are beginning to reach large audiences.
The Broadcasting Board of
Governors has asked for much larger resources. It should get them.
The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library
programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope.
Where such assistance is provided, it should be identified as coming from
the citizens of the United States. (pg. 377)
8. The U.S. government should offer to join with
other nations in generously supporting a new International
Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds will be spent directly for
building and operating primary and secondary schools in those
Muslim states that commit to sensibly investing their own money
in public education. (pg. 378)
9. A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should
include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies,
and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to
enhance prospects for their children's future. (pg. 379)
10. The United States should engage other nations in
developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism.
There are several multilateral institutions in which such issues
should be addressed. But the most important policies should be
discussed and coordinated in a flexible contact group of leading
coalition governments. This is a good place, for example, to
develop joint strategies for targeting terrorist travel, or
for hammering out a common strategy for the places where
terrorists may be finding sanctuary. (pg. 379)
11. The United States should engage its friends to develop a
common coalition approach toward the detention and humane treatment of
captured terrorists. New principles might draw upon Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions on the law of armed conflict.
That article was specifically designed for those cases in which the usual
laws of war did not apply. Its minimum standards are generally accepted
throughout the world as customary international law. (pg. 380)
12. Our report shows that al Qaeda has tried to acquire or
make weapons of mass destruction for at least ten years. There is no doubt
the United States would be a prime target. Preventing the proliferation of
these weapons warrants a maximum effort-by strengthening
counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security
Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
(pg. 381)
13. Vigorous efforts to track terrorist
financing must remain front and center in U.S. counterterrorism
efforts. The government has recognized that information
about terrorist money helps us to understand their networks,
search them out, and disrupt their operations. Intelligence
and law enforcement have targeted the relatively small
number of financial facilitators-individuals al Qaeda
relied on for their ability to raise and
deliver money-at the core of al Qaeda's revenue stream.
These efforts have
worked. The death or capture of several important
facilitators has decreased
the amount of money available to al Qaeda and has
increased its costs and
difficulty in raising and moving that money.
Captures have additionally
provided a windfall of intelligence that can
be used to continue the cycle
of disruption. (pg. 382)
14. Targeting travel is at least as powerful a
weapon against terrorists as targeting their money. The United
States should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations,
and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find
terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility. (pg. 385)
15. The U.S. border security system should be
integrated into a larger network of screening points that
includes our transportation system and access to vital facilities,
such as nuclear reactors. The President should direct the
Department of Homeland Security to lead the effort to design
a comprehensive screening system, addressing common problems
and setting common standards with systemwide goals in mind.
Extending those standards among other governments could
dramatically strengthen America and the world's collective
ability to intercept individuals who pose catastrophic threats. (pg. 387)
16. The Department of Homeland Security, properly
supported by the Congress, should complete, as quickly as possible,
a biometric entry-exit screening system, including a single system
for speeding qualified travelers. It should be integrated with the
system that provides benefits to foreigners seeking to stay in the
United States. Linking biometric passports to good data systems
and decisionmaking is a fundamental goal. No one can hide his or
her debt by acquiring a credit card with a slightly different
name. Yet today, a terrorist can defeat the link to electronic
records by tossing away an old passport and slightly altering
the name in the new one. (pg. 389)
17. The U.S. government cannot meet its own obligations
to the American people to prevent the entry of terrorists without
a major effort to collaborate with other governments. We should do
more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies, and
raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel and
border crossing over the medium and long term through extensive
international cooperation. (pg. 390)
18. Secure identification should begin in the United States.
The federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth
certificates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses.
Fraud in identification documents is no longer just a problem of theft.
At many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for
boarding aircraft, sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that
people are who they say they are and to check whether they are terrorists. (pg. 390)
19. Hard choices must be made in allocating
limited resources. The U.S. government should identify
and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be
protected, set risk-based priorities for defending them,
select the most practical and cost-effective ways of
doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and funding
to implement the effort. The plan should assign roles
and missions to the relevant authorities (federal, state,
regional, and local) and to private stakeholders.
In measuring effectiveness, perfection is unattainable.
But terrorists should perceive that potential targets
are defended. They may be deterred by a significant
chance of failure. (pg. 391)
20. Improved use of "no-fly" and "automatic selectee"
lists should not be delayed while the argument about a successor
to CAPPS continues. This screening function should be performed
by the TSA, and it should utilize the larger set of watchlists
maintained by the federal government. Air carriers should be
required to supply the information needed to test and implement
this new system. (pg. 393)
21. The TSA and the Congress must give
priority attention to improving the ability of screening
checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. As a start,
each individual selected for special screening should be
screened for explosives. Further, the TSA should conduct
a human factors study, a method often used in the private
sector, to understand problems in screener performance and
set attainable objectives for individual screeners and for
the checkpoints where screening takes place.
(pg. 393)
22. As the President determines the guidelines for
information sharing among government agencies and by those agencies
with the private sector, he should safeguard the privacy of individuals
about whom information is shared. (pg. 394)
23. The burden of proof for retaining a particular
governmental power should be on the executive, to explain (a)
that the power actually materially enhances security and (b)
that there is adequate supervision of the executive's use
of the powers to ensure protection of civil liberties. If
the power is granted, there must be adequate guidelines and
oversight to properly confine its use. (pg. 394-5)
24. At this time of increased and consolidated
government authority, there should be a board within the
executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we
recommend and the commitment the government makes to defend
our civil liberties.(pg.395)
25. Homeland security assistance should be
based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities.
Now, in 2004, Washington, D.C., and New York City are
certainly at the top of any such list. We understand the
contention that every state and city needs to have some
minimum infrastructure for emergency response. But federal
homeland security assistance should not remain a program
for general revenue sharing. It
should supplement state and local resources based on the
risks or vulnerabilities that merit additional support.
Congress should not use this money as a pork barrel. (pg. 396)
26. Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt
the Incident Command System (ICS). When multiple agencies or multiple
jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a unified command.
Both are proven frameworks for emergency response. We strongly
support the decision that federal homeland security funding
will be contingent, as of October 1, 2004, upon the adoption
and regular use of ICS and unified command procedures. In the
future, the Department of Homeland Security should consider
making funding contingent on aggressive and realistic training in
accordance with ICS and unified command procedures. (pg.397)
27. Congress should support pending legislation
which provides for the expedited and increased assignment of radio
spectrum for public safety purposes. Furthermore, high-risk urban
areas such as New York City and Washington, D.C., should establish
signal corps units to ensure communications connectivity between
and among civilian authorities, local first responders, and the
National Guard. Federal funding of such units should be given
high priority by Congress. (pg. 397)
28. We endorse the American National Standards Institute's
recommended standard for private preparedness. We were encouraged by
Secretary Tom Ridge's praise of the standard, and urge the Department of
Homeland Security to promote its adoption. We also encourage the insurance
and credit-rating industries to look closely at a company's compliance with
the ANSI standard in assessing its insurability and creditworthiness. We
believe that compliance with the standard should define the standard of care
owed by a company to its employees and the public for legal purposes.
Private-sector preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost of doing business
in the post-9/11 world. It is ignored at a tremendous potential cost in
lives, money, and national security. (pg. 398)
29. We recommend the establishment of a National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), built on the foundation of
the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).
Breaking the older mold of national government organization,
this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning
and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various
agencies. The head of the NCTC should have authority to evaluate the
performance of the people assigned to the Center. (pg. 403)
30. The current position of Director of Central Intelligence
should be replaced by a National Intelligence Director with two main areas
of responsibility: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on specific
subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) to manage the
national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to
it. (pg. 411)
31. The CIA Director should emphasize (a)
rebuilding the CIA's analytic capabilities; (b) transforming
the clandestine service by building its human intelligence
capabilities; (c) developing a stronger language program,
with high standards and sufficient financial incentives;
(d) renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operations
officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities;
(e) ensuring a seamless relationship between human source
collection and signals collection at the operational level;
and (f) stressing a better balance between unilateral and
liaison operations. (pg. 415)
32. Lead responsibility for directing and
executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or
covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it
should be consolidated with the capabilities for training,
direction, and execution of such operations already being
developed in the Special Operations Command. (pg. 415)
33. Finally, to combat the secrecy and complexity
we have described, the overall amounts of money being appropriated
for national intelligence and to its component agencies should no
longer be kept secret. Congress should pass a separate appropriations
act for intelligence, defending the broad allocation of how these
tens of billions of dollars have been assigned among the varieties
of intelligence work. (pg. 416)
34. Information procedures should provide incentives
for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and shared
knowledge. (pg. 417)
35. The president should lead the government-wide effort
to bring the major national security institutions into the information
revolution. He should coordinate the resolution of the legal, policy,
and technical issues across agencies to create a "trusted information
network." (pg. 418)
36. Congressional oversight for intelligence-and
counterterrorism-is now dysfunctional. Congress should address
this problem. We have considered various alternatives: A joint
committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
is one. A single committee in each house of Congress, combining
authorizing and appropriating authorities, is another. (pg. 420)
37. Congress should create a single, principal point of
oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders
are best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over
this department and its duties. But we believe that Congress does
have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the
Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent standing
committee with a nonpartisan staff. (pg. 421)
38. Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little
or no notice, we should minimize as much as possible the disruption
of national security policymaking during the change of administrations
by accelerating the process for national security appointments. We think
the process could be improved significantly so transitions can work
more effectively and allow new officials to assume their new
responsibilities as quickly as possible. (pg. 422)
39. A specialized and integrated national security
workforce should be established at the FBI consisting of agents,
analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited,
trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an
institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence
and national security. (pg. 425-6)
40. The Department of Defense and its oversight
committees should regularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command's
strategies and planning to defend the United States against military
threats to the homeland. (pg. 428)
41. The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight
committees should regularly assess the types of threats the country faces
to determine (a) the adequacy of the government's plans-and the progress
against those plans-to protect America's critical infrastructure and
(b) the readiness of the government to respond to the threats that the
United States might face. (pg. 428)
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