FSC Recommended List of Witnesses and Questions
Revised March 18, 2004
Part 2: Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
George Tenet, Director of the CIA
1. Why didn’t the CIA share vital information about the terrorists with the FBI?
2. Is the October 31, 2001 story by Le Figaro true which wrote of Osama bin Laden meeting with a CIA officer in Dubai in July, 2001?
• If so, why wasn’t he taken into custody?
* Recommendation: The Commission should contact Dr, Terry Callaway, the Canadian surgeon, reported to have been treating Bin Laden at the Dubai hospital for a kidney disorder, to request information about bin Laden’s medical condition and about whether he is aware of a meeting between bin Laden and a local CIA operative in July , 2001.
The Commission should also interview that Dubai CIA operative who was recalled to headquarters on July 15, 2001.
3. According Senator Ike Skelton (D- Missouri) in an interview on National Public Radio on the morning of September 11th, 2001, you had recently warned Congress of an imminent attack… “So this is not entirely unexpected.”
•What intelligence prompted you to draw that conclusion?
•When was this information shared with Congress?
•Specifically, what information about an imminent attack was shared with Congress?
•Was any of this information shared with any member of the National Security Council?
· If so, when was it shared?
·What information was provided?
·Which members were briefed?
• Was anyone at the National Security Agency, or any other intelligence agency, or the Department of Defense briefed on this information? If so, when?
4. Re: Mohammed Atta:
It has been reported that Atta was on multiple watch lists.
•How did he slip through CIA surveillance?
•Please produce a timeline of Atta’s travels
Atta was in Portland, Maine on September 10, 2001.
•What was he doing there?
5. Why weren’t all suspected terrorists and wanted terrorists placed on watch lists to prevent them from entering our country? Why wasn’t this information shared with the INS guarding our borders?
From The Complete 9/11 Timeline, Part 2: Jan. 2001-Sept. 11, 2001 by Paul Thompson:
“January 4, 2001: The FBI’s investigation into the USS Cole bombing learns that terrorist Khallad bin Atash had been a principal planner of the bombing [AP, 9/21/02], and that two other participants in the bombing had delivered money to bin Atash at the time of the January 2000 meeting in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000). The FBI shares this information with the CIA, and when CIA analysts reexamine pictures from the Malaysian meeting to learn more about this, they find a picture of him standing next to hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02, Newsweek, 6/2/02] The CIA is aware that Almihdhar entered the US a year earlier, yet they don’t attempt to find him. CNN later notes that at this point the CIA at least “could have put Alhazmi and Almihdhar and all others who attended the meeting in Malaysia on a watch list to be kept out of this country. It was not done.” [CNN, 6/4/02] More incredibly, even bin Atash is not placed on the watch list at this time, despite being labeled as the principal planner of the Cole bombing. [Los Angeles Times, 9/22/02] ”
[excerpt from webpage]
6. Given the testimony in the trial in May, 2001 (below) were flight schools advised to be vigilant for Middle Eastern men training to be pilots and advised to report anything unusual? If not, please explain.
“MAY 29, 2001 Four men are convicted in the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Witnesses testified at the trial that Osama bin Laden was sending al Qaeda agents to the United States for flight-school training and acquiring planes.”
[See sidebar—EXTRA INFORMATION, Timeline: Who Knew What and When? Using yellow arrow, navigate to “May 29, 2001”]
7. What information did the CIA receive from foreign entities about al Qaeda members, other potential terrorists, and plans to attack America within the Continental United States? With whom in our government did the CIA share this information?
8. Did any foreign intelligence agencies translate the September 10th intercepts about tomorrow being the zero day prior to September 11th?
•If so, when did they communicate that information to our security agencies?
•Who received that information?
•What did they do with it?
9. Did the CIA receive a translation of this communication or any other communication which specified the date, plan or targets from any source (foreign intelligence agency, foreign government, diplomat etc.?)
10. Considering the high volume of traffic and multiple warnings from foreign governments, why didn’t the CIA anticipate and recommend defensive measures to thwart the impending attack?
11. There were an extraordinarily large number of stock puts on American and United airlines stock and others which were subsequently impacted by the terrorist attack.
“It is well documented that the CIA has long monitored such trades – in real time – as potential warnings of terrorist attacks and other economic moves contrary to U.S. interests.
•Was the CIA monitoring the financial markets in the weeks preceding September 11th? If so, via what system and/or software were the markets monitored?
•Was such activity viewed as a warning of an impending attack?
•Did the CIA, in coordination with other agencies, both domestic and abroad, investigate the purchasers of those stock puts?
•Please provide the names of those individuals, investment groups and others who purchased the stock puts in question and the reasons they gave for anticipating a drop in the stocks of companies which coincidentally happened to have been severely impacted on September 11th.
12. Was our national security compromised by convicted spy Robert Hanssen’s sale of Promis software to Russia?
13. How did Promis software end up in the hands of bin Laden? In what ways could Promis be useful to al Qaeda?
14. Given that the attack was apparently known in the Muslim community, (based on the following information) how is it that our intelligence agents did not know of the impending attack?
•A Palestinian youth pointed to the Towers and indicated that they wouldn’t be standing week
•members of a Brooklyn mosque were warned
15. Please explain the role of the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency, in aiding bin Laden and/or the al Qaeda from 1998 through the present.
“Between 1980 and the end of the Afghan/Soviet war in 1989, the CIA and Pakistan’s ISI [Inter Services Intelligence] recruited some 35,000 Muslim radicals join Afghanistan’s fight. The US and Saudi Arabia gave up to $40 billion total to support the mujaheddin guerrilla fighters opposing the Russians. Most of the money is managed by the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency. At the same time, Osama bin Laden begins providing financial, organizational, and engineering aid for the mujaheddin in Afghanistan, with the advice and support of the Saudi royal family. The CIA, the ISI and Osama continued to work together against the Soviets until the end of the war.“
16. Has the CIA uncovered any evidence that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a Pakistani, is linked to the Pakistani ISI?
17. Please describe the historical and current relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s ISI, including the significance of Musharraf’s visit to Saudi Arabia 20 days after the coup and the Saudi pledge of “massive ” financial aid.
18. Please comment on Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the 1999 coup in Pakistan which installed Musharraf as leader, and coincidentally occurred on the eve of a planned US effort to capture bin Laden. Musharraf scuttled U.S. plans to capture bin Laden.
CIA agent who alerted the FBI about Almihdhar and Alhazmi
1. The JICI Report says that a concerned CIA agent working at the FBI triggered a review which fell to an FBI analyst and CTC. The analyst determined that the two San Diego terrorists had entered the country and they were finally watch listed on August 23, 2001.
However, the FAA was not notified. [JICI Report, p.15] Supposedly, no one could locate the terrorists. But that doesn’t make sense.
•According to the JICI Report, someone at the CIA knew that Almihdhar and Alhazmi were in the country and had failed to tell the FBI. Why do you suppose you had not been informed by headquarters that the terrorists were in San Diego?